中國利率市場化關(guān)山重重
中國利率市場化關(guān)山重重
China’s Interest Rate Liberalization: Bumpy Road Ahead
經(jīng)國務(wù)院批準,中國人民銀行決定,自7月20日起放開金融機構(gòu)貸款利率管制,取消金融機構(gòu)貸款利率7折的下限,但保留個人房貸利率為基準利率7折的下限。
The People’s Bank of China, with the approval of the State Council, has made a decision, which takes effect from July 20, 2013, to remove controls on lending rates applied to financial institutions by scrapping the floor on lending rates previously set at 70 percent of the benchmark rate. However, the floor on housing mortgage rates remains unchanged at 70 percent of the benchmark level.
取消貸款利率下限有兩方面的增益:其一,這是利率市場化進程中的必要一步。銀行只有通過利率市場化后形成的競爭性環(huán)境,才能真正發(fā)育為實質(zhì)性的市場主體,并在競爭中優(yōu)化資產(chǎn)負債表,將錢放到該去的地方。其二,意味著除住房市場外的其他領(lǐng)域,企業(yè)融資成本降低的機會大大增加,相當于拓寬了實體經(jīng)濟的融資渠道。
The benefits to be gained from lifting the floor on lending rates are twofold. First, the move is a step necessary for China’s interest rate liberalization which contributes to the creation of a competitive environment where banks will grow into real market players, thereby streamlining their balance sheets while ensuring that their money is directed to where it should be. Second, the move allows enterprises in all sectors to increase dramatically their chances of reducing financing costs except for those operating in the housing market sector, thus broadening financing channels for the real economy.
不過,取消貸款利率下限與利率市場化和實體經(jīng)濟獲益的目標之間,仍然關(guān)山重重。一方面,實現(xiàn)利率市場化,最直接的方式是取消存款利率上限,這一步尚未邁出。在充分競爭的環(huán)境尚未形成的情況下,資金相對充裕、資金來源成本較低的大銀行,不會因為新政策主動采取降低利潤的競爭方式。而那些資金拆借成本高的中小銀行,更不會輕易應(yīng)用新政策。因此,實施基準以上貸款利率水平,仍將是銀行愿意遵守的“行規(guī)”。
However, there are still literally enormous hurdles to the liberalization of interest rates and ultimately to the goal of gaining benefits for the real economy even with the removal of the floor on lending rates. Although a fast and direct way of liberalizing China’s interest rate regime is to lift the ceiling on deposit rates once and for all, such a step remains to be taken. In an environment where there is a lack of full competition, big banks will not, due to their sufficient available funds and relatively low costs of acquiring them, voluntarily engage in competition by reducing their profit margins following the introduction of the new policy. Meanwhile, it is even less likely that the micro, small and medium-sized banks will apply the new policy given the higher costs of inter-bank borrowing. Therefore, there seems to be an accepted norm across China’s banking sector that will determine the banks’ willingness to set lending rates above the benchmark level.
另一方面,實體經(jīng)濟中能享受貸款利率下限優(yōu)惠的,通常是實力雄厚的大企業(yè)。如果銀行不能迅速成長為自主性較強的競爭主體,如果受到行政干擾或?qū)ぷ獾恼T惑,那么取消貸款利率下限的政策紅利,很可能被權(quán)勢企業(yè)、利益關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)獨占,進一步加劇資金的錯配。
From another perspective, it is evident that only those large and powerful enterprises in the real economy will have access to the benefits derived from the removal of the floor on lending rates. Therefore, banks need to be quickly transformed into highly independent competitive entities, or otherwise they will continue to invite administrative interference and rent-seeking activities. Under such circumstances, the implementation of the new policy is most likely to bring tangible benefits only to those enterprises in positions of power and authority, or to those well-connected enterprises, further exacerbating the misallocation of capital.
很顯然,僅僅取消貸款利率下限,很難產(chǎn)生巨大的增值利益,這仍是一種助跑式改革,是為完成利率市場化積累功能,而非關(guān)鍵一躍。只有取消存款利率上限等新政迅速跟進,改革紅利才可能真正增長出來。
Obviously, massive profits can hardly accrue merely from the removal of the floor on lending rates. This is not so much about a crucial step towards the success of the reform as it is about building up a momentum towards it. Tangible benefits can be fully generated out of the reform, but only when the ceiling on deposit rates is lifted, coupled with other follow-up measures being taken in a timely manner.
而從金融服務(wù)實體經(jīng)濟、管理通脹預(yù)期這兩個最重要職能的角度講,即使完成了利率市場化,也不意味著實體經(jīng)濟——主要指中小微企業(yè)就能獲得較充沛的資金幫助。因為,從市場的角度看,中小微企業(yè)的信用等級永遠無法與大企業(yè)相比。市場化的銀行,仍會傾向于將資金向大企業(yè)傾斜,而忽視中小微企業(yè)。
In terms of the fundamental nature of bank financing, whose two principal functions are to provide financial services to the real economy and anchor inflation expectations, the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, which represent part of the real economy, will find it hard to obtain reasonably sufficient financial assistance even with the liberalization of China’s interest rate regime. The reason behind is that, from a market perspective, the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises will always pale in comparison to the large ones over the status of their credit rating. Market oriented banks are likely to shift their lending funds into the large enterprises and away from the micro, small and medium-sized ones.
讓銀行成為真銀行,讓行長成為銀行家,僅靠銀行內(nèi)部改革不足以完成,還需輔以更深入和果斷的財政改革等外部力量。比如,如果財稅政策和地方收費政策能真正實施對中小微企業(yè)的傾斜政策,那么這些對就業(yè)率和GDP貢獻最大的企業(yè)的信用等級就會提高,銀行的貸款熱情將被激活,金融服務(wù)實體經(jīng)濟就不再是一個難以兌現(xiàn)的承諾。
Let Chinese banks be real banks and their chiefs be real bankers. This requires not only the banks’ internal reforms, but also deeper and tougher fiscal reforms and other initiatives needed as an external driving force. For example, if fiscal and tax policies, and local charging policies can be titled in favor of the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, which contribute most to GDP and employment, it can be surely presumed that credit ratings of these enterprises will end up being upgraded. As a consequence, banks, with their enthusiasm for lending being aroused, will deliver financial services to the real economy — a promise which is hard to keep now, and will be fulfilled in the future.
從這個角度講,取消貸款利率下限如同一個窗口,映射著金融和財稅體制改革的力度和配套性。前路依然曲折,改革仍需不間斷推出。
Seem from this perspective, lifting the floor on lending rates is just a signal indicating the extent to which reforms of the financial, fiscal and tax systems can be undertaken, and the degree to which these reforms need to be matched with appropriate supporting measures. In any event, the road ahead is filled with twists and turns calling for more reforms to be announced in the future.